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Abstract
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the require-
ment that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given
payoﬀ type space as well as with a given space of ﬁrst-order beliefs about the
other agents’ payoﬀ types. This last bit, which constitutes our reinterpreta-
tion of the Wilson doctrine, allows us to obtain very permissive results. Our
ﬁrst result is that generically, if there are at least three alternatives, any in-
centive compatible social choice function is robustly virtually implementable
in iteratively undominated strategies. Further, we characterize robust virtual
implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by means of incentive
compatibility and measurability. Our characterization is independent of the
presence of monetary transfers or assumptions alike, made in previous studies.
Our work also clariﬁes the measurability condition in connection to the generic
diversity of preferences used in our ﬁrst result.
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1“Game Theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the con-
sequences of trading rules that presumably are really common knowl-
edge; it is deﬁcient to the extent it assumes other features to be common
knowledge, such as one player’s probability assessment about another’s
preferences or information.
I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive re-
ductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful
analysis of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common
knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.”
Robert Wilson (1987)
1 Introduction
The theory of implementation attempts to identify the conditions under which a
social choice rule may be decentralized; that is, when agents, acting on their self-
interest, arrive at the outcomes prescribed by the social choice rule. In contexts in
which the economic authority knows what agents’ types might be, but does not know
what they actually are, the theory has uncovered necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for such decentralization.1 In many circumstances, one should expect that, apart
from the economic authority’s informational constraints, agents themselves be also
asymmetrically informed about each other’s preferences, beliefs or signals.
For such incomplete information environments, a necessary condition for the im-
plementation of any rule is its incentive compatibility. Some authors refer to this
condition as informational feasibility, and give it the same stature as physical feasi-
bility (e.g., Myerson (1989)): by the revelation principle, a rule is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian equilibrium if and only if it is incentive compatible. Yet the
direct revelation mechanism that yields a truthfully implementable rule will typically
have additional equilibria, and these equilibria are undesirable in the sense of not
being consistent with the original social choice rule. This motivates the question
of full implementation: the search for mechanisms whose entire set of equilibrium
outcomes relates to the given rule. Full implementation in incomplete information
1See Jackson (2001), Maskin and Sjostrom (2002), Palfrey (2002) or Serrano (2004) for recent
surveys.
2environments will be the notion of implementation sought in the current paper.
When the set of equilibrium outcomes is required to coincide with those picked
out by the rule, we speak of exact implementation. A new necessary condition –
Bayesian monotonicity – emerges in this case in addition to incentive compatibility
(Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), Jackson (1991)).
Moreover, Jackson (1991) ﬁnds the version of this condition that, along with in-
centive compatibility and other assumptions, yields a characterization of Bayesian
implementable rules.
It is well-known that Bayesian monotonicity may sometimes be a very restrictive
condition (e.g., Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), Chakravorti (1992)). In view of this,
one can relax the requirement of exact implementation, and, instead, ask that the set
of equilibrium outcomes approximates the rule. This is the approach known as vir-
tual implementation, which has conﬁned its scope to social choice functions (SCFs).
Though some new suﬃcient conditions accompanying incentive compatibility were
identiﬁed (incentive consistency in Duggan (1997), measurability in Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992)), they were not necessary conditions, and not even logically weaker
than Bayesian monotonicity (as shown in Serrano and Vohra (2001)). Finally, Ser-
rano and Vohra (2005) identify the condition of virtual monotonicity, which, along
with incentive compatibility, characterizes virtual implementation in Bayesian equi-
librium. It is argued there that virtual monotonicity is an extremely weak condition,
strictly weaker than Bayesian monotonicity and measurability, and trivially satisﬁed
by all SCFs in “most” environments.
From the view-point of the realism of the approach, all these papers have an im-
portant drawback. Following the Wilson doctrine, expressed in the quote by Wilson
(1987) at the beginning of our introduction, the theory should aim to relax undesir-
able common knowledge assumptions among the agents. In particular, one should
avoid in mechanisms the use of the notion of a type. A type, which includes the
speciﬁcation of higher-order beliefs for a player, may well be far too complex an
object to describe. Accepting this view, the usual route taken by researchers has
been to prevent the use of any consideration of beliefs in the message spaces. Thus,
mechanisms have been constructed on the basis of only that part of the type that is
payoﬀ relevant, the so-called payoﬀ type.
In a series of papers, Bergemann and Morris (2005a, 2005b, 2007) seek for robust
3implementation results. Their work relevant to the current paper is contained in
their latter two papers, which deal with full implementation. Faithful to the Wilson
doctrine, they construct mechanisms that rely exclusively on the use of payoﬀ types,
and require that implementation must obtain for any type space consistent with the
original payoﬀ type space. When insisting on robust exact implementation, Berge-
mann and Morris identify ex-post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity as
necessary and almost suﬃcient conditions. They also consider robust virtual imple-
mentation and identify ex-post incentive compatibility and robust measurability as
the corresponding key conditions for this case. These conditions are very restrictive,
stronger than their counterparts for exact or virtual implementation for a ﬁxed type
space. For instance, ex-post incentive compatibility would generically require an SCF
to be constant (Jehiel et al. (2006)). Bergemann and Morris interpret their negative
results for virtual implementation as a consequence of the robustness approach. They
suggest that “the distance between [exact] and virtual implementation may shrink
considerably after imposing robustness on the implementation concept” (Bergemann
and Morris, 2005b, p. 42) and that the constructions for virtual implementation
rely “on the implicit assumption that there is a common knowledge of mapping from
beliefs to payoﬀ types of all agents (a “Beliefs-Determine-Preferences” property)”
(Bergemann and Morris, 2007, p. 5). We shall oﬀer now a diﬀerent interpretation.
To show the diﬃculties of robust virtual implementation, Bergemann and Morris
(2005b, 2007) construct a very speciﬁc type space in which the interim preferences
of all types are aligned. That virtual Bayesian implementation may fail exactly for
this reason has already been pointed out in Serrano and Vohra (2001) in a standard
Bayesian environment with a ﬁxed type space. Yet, such failures are “rare:” if
the environment satisﬁes type diversity, every incentive compatible SCF is virtually
implementable (Serrano and Vohra (2005)). That is, virtual implementation is as
successful as it can possibly be. Furthermore, in environments with at least three
alternatives, type diversity is generically satisﬁed.
This paper reconsiders the problem of robust virtual implementation. Our ap-
proach is the following. First, we take from the foundations of game theory that,
when requiring robustness results with respect to consistent type spaces, equilibrium
restrictions are not imposed beyond the ones identiﬁed by the weaker solution con-
cept of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. This will be the solution
4concept we shall employ, and in doing so, we are building on an important paper by
Abreu and Matsushima (1992).2
Our main point of departure from the usual interpretation of the Wilson doctrine
is that we shall allow the use of ﬁrst-order beliefs over payoﬀ types, along with payoﬀ
types, in our mechanisms. This is a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine that does
not seem too demanding: after all, people are usually capable of providing simple
probability assessments; we could think here of an insurance problem, for instance.
The combination of payoﬀ type and ﬁrst-order belief for a player will comprise our
notion of a pseudo-type. Therefore, we shall ﬁx a (typically quite rich) space of
pseudo-types, which we will assume to be common knowledge among the agents,
and we shall require that implementation obtains for all type spaces consistent with
our original pseudo-type space.
The resulting theorems we obtain send a very diﬀerent message from the one sent
by Bergemann and Morris (2005b, 2007) for robust virtual implementation. First,
we propose a condition that we term pseudo-type diversity and show (Theorem 1)
that in such environments every SCF that is incentive compatible in every type space
consistent with the original pseudo-type space is robustly virtually implementable
in iteratively undominated strategies. Thus, there is no need to go all the way
to requiring ex-post incentive compatibility – the relevant interim notion for every
pseudo-type in the model suﬃces. Second, pseudo-type diversity again happens to
be generic when there are at least three alternatives; thus, one does not need to rely
on any additional condition “most of the time.”
Next, we seek to obtain a characterization. We extend the work of Abreu and
Matsushima (1992) to our settings. Theorem 2 shows that incentive compatibil-
ity for every consistent type space and A-M measurability – introduced in Abreu
and Matsushima (1992) – are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for robust virtual
2Following Bergemann and Morris (2005b) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), we can also
characterize our solution concept – iteratively undominated strategies – in terms of interim ratio-
nalizability which, in turn, is equivalent to the Bayesian equilibria in all consistent type spaces.
There are, however, two reasons why our deﬁnition of interim rationalizability is more demanding
than that of Bergemann and Morris (2005b). First, we include the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs over the
payoﬀ type space as part of the environment which is assumed to be common knowledge. Second, at
each round of elimination of never best responses, we explicitly require agents’ ﬁrst-order beliefs to
be consistent with the environment. This is termed ∆-rationalizability in Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2003).
5implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Importantly, we relax an as-
sumption made by Abreu and Matsushima on the environment, which essentially
amounts to quasilinear utilities on a nummeraire, on which small punishments are
imposed. Moreover, we elaborate on the connection between pseudo-type diversity
and A-M measurability: as hinted in the original paper by Abreu and Matsushima,
the pseudo-type diversity condition is associated with the ﬁrst iteration of the mea-
surability algorithm, which, in general, may have multiple steps. The algorithm
determines the maximum possible separation of types – or pseudo-types – on the ba-
sis of their interim preferences.3 We also note that the proofs of our Theorems 1 and
2 follow the same logic, further underscoring the link between pseudo-type diversity
and measurability.
A ﬁnal word is called for regarding the nature of our mechanisms and the con-
nection with virtual implementation in Bayesian equilibrium. First, the distinction
between implementation in pure- or mixed-strategy equilibria is of no signiﬁcance,
once we ask for robustness with respect to type spaces. Our suﬃciency result applies
a fortiori to virtual implementation in mixed-strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Al-
though virtual implementation in Bayesian equilibrium is typically more permissive
than virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies,4 the diﬀerence is
small in that it concerns environments violating pseudo-type diversity. Furthermore,
the additional SCFs so implemented must rely on the use of non-regular mechanisms
(e.g., using integer games and devices alike): following a result of Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992) for a ﬁxed type space, A-M measurability is necessary for robust
virtual implementation in Bayesian equilibrium if one uses regular mechanisms. Our
mechanisms are ﬁnite, and best responses always exist.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the preliminary
notation and deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we present our ﬁrst mechanism, which is used
in Section 4 to prove our main result (Theorem 1). Section 5 is concerned with
A-M measurability, used in Section 6 for the characterization result (Theorem 2).
In Section 7 we explain the connection of our results with those in virtual Bayesian
implementation. We conclude in Section 8.
3See also a related discussion of indistinguishability in Bergemann and Morris (2007).
4For each ﬁxed type space, this follows since virtual monotonicity is strictly weaker than A-M
measurability.
62 Preliminaries
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of agents and Θi be the set of ﬁnite payoﬀ-
relevant (or, simply, payoﬀ ) types of agent i. Denote Θ ≡ Θ1 × ··· × Θn, and
Θ−i ≡ Θ1 × ··· × Θi−1 × Θi+1 × ···Θn.5 Let qi(θ−i|θi) denote agent i’s ﬁrst-order
belief that other agents receive the proﬁle of payoﬀ types θ−i when his payoﬀ type
is θi. Let Qi be the ﬁnite set of such probabilistic ﬁrst-order beliefs of agent i. We
call Ti = Θi × Qi the ﬁnite set of pseudo-types of agent i. Agent i’s pseudo-type
ti contains information about his payoﬀ type θi and the ﬁrst-order belief over Θ−i
conditional on θi.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be independent
of the information state. Let A be a σ-algebra on A and ∆(A) denote the set of
probability measures on (A,A) with countable supports.
Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted
ui : ∆(A) × Θ → R.
We can now deﬁne an environment as E = ((A,A),{ui,Θi,Qi}i∈N), which is
implicitly understood to be common knowledge among the agents.
We denote a type of agent i by τi and the agent i’s set of types by Ti. A type τi of
agent i must include a description of his pseudo-type, which in turn includes a payoﬀ
type. Thus, there is a function ˆ ti : Ti → Ti, with ˆ ti(τi) being agent i’s pseudo-type
when his type is τi. We shall write ˆ t(τ) to refer to the proﬁle of pseudo-types when
the type proﬁle is τ. There is also a function ˆ θi : Ti → Θi, with ˆ θi(τi) being agent
i’s payoﬀ type when his type is τi. We shall write ˆ θ(τ) to denote the payoﬀ type
proﬁle when the proﬁle of types is τ. With some abuse of notation, let ˆ θi(ti) be
agent i ’s payoﬀ type when his pseudo-type is ti. A type τi of agent i must also
include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents; thus, for any
τ−i ∈ T−i, πi(τ−i|τi) denotes the probability that agent i of type τi assigns to other
agents having types τ−i.
We require that types, pseudo-types and payoﬀ types are consistent with each
other. We express the consistency requirement in the following deﬁnition. A type
space T is a collection:
T = (Ti, ˆ θi,ˆ ti,πi)i∈N.
5Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
7Deﬁnition 1 A type space T ≡ (Ti, ˆ θi,ˆ ti,πi)i∈N is said to be consistent with an
environment E = ((A,A),{ui,Θi,Qi}i∈N) if, for every i ∈ N and every type τi ∈ Ti,
the following two conditions must hold:
1. ˆ θi(τi) ∈ Θi and ˆ ti(τi) ∈ Θi × Qi; and
2. ˆ θi(τi) = θi whenever ˆ ti(τi) = (θi,qi) for some (θi,qi) ∈ Θi × Qi.
The ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition is just the requirement that pseudo-type and
payoﬀ type be consistent with the agent’s type. This requirement, for payoﬀ types,
has also been imposed in Bergemann and Morris (2005a, 2005b, 2007). The second
part requires similar consistency between pseudo-types and payoﬀ types. These two
requirements, in turn, imply that, for any τi ∈ Ti with ˆ ti(τi) = ti = (ˆ θi(ti),qi),
X
τ−i:ˆ t−i(τ−i)=t−i
πi(τ−i|τi) = qi(ˆ θ−i(t−i)|ˆ θi(ti))
The consistency we have just deﬁned essentially reduces to the requirement that
the various levels of beliefs of an individual do not contradict one another. This
requirement is the same as common knowledge of coherency, which is imposed when
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) and Mertens and Zamir (1985) construct the uni-
versal type space. The only diﬀerence here is that the underlying state space – the
pseudo-type space – includes not only the payoﬀ type space but also the set of the
ﬁrst-order beliefs over the payoﬀ type space.
When a consistent type space T satisﬁes the properties that Ti = Θi and Qi is
a singleton for each agent i ∈ N, then the true type space is common knowledge.
This corresponds to the ﬁxed Bayesian environment (e.g., Postlewaite and Schmei-
dler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), Jackson (1991), Abreu and Matsushima
(1992), Duggan (1997), Serrano and Vohra (2001, 2005)). When Qi includes any
possible belief of i over Θ−i – that is, Qi is not assumed to be common knowledge
among agents in N – this corresponds to the payoﬀ environment of Bergemann and
Morris (2005b, 2007). Our approach is in between these two extremes, as it allows
Qi to include an arbitrarily large, but ﬁnite, number of beliefs. We note that Berge-
mann and Morris (2007) also make the ﬁniteness assumption on the space of payoﬀ
types.
8A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : T → ∆(A). Note that the
domain of the SCFs is not the true type space, but the pseudo-type space. That
is, the goals of society do not depend on the possibly far too complex higher-order
beliefs structure, but they might depend on payoﬀ relevant information, as well as
on ﬁrst-order beliefs about it.6
Fix any consistent type space T throughout. The interim expected utility of




πi(τ−i|τi)ui(f(ˆ t(τi,τ−i)); ˆ θ(τi,τ−i))
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N,g) describes a message space Mi for agent i and an
outcome function g : M → ∆(A), where M = ×i∈NMi. Let σi : Ti → Mi denote a
(pure) strategy for agent i and Σi his set of pure strategies. Let




Given a mechanism Γ = (M,g), let Hi be a subset of Σi.
Deﬁnition 2 (Strict Dominance) 7 A strategy σi ∈ Hi is strictly dominated
for player i with respect to H = ×j∈NHj if there exist τi ∈ Ti and σ
0
i ∈ Hi such that
for every σ−i ∈ ×j6=iHj,
Ui(g ◦ (σ
0
i,σ−i)|τi) > Ui(g ◦ (σi,σ−i)|τi).
6This last bit allows our model to cover environments in which the only uncertainty concerns
information, as in basic insurance problems (see, for example, Serrano and Vohra (2001, Example
1)). To accomodate that example into our model, since no uncertainty exists over payoﬀ types, one
can add a space of signals over which ﬁrst-order beliefs are deﬁned.
7We use the same deﬁnition of strict dominance as Abreu and Matsushima (1992), yet we note
that we could obtain our results with the less demanding notion of dominance, which require a
strategy to be dominated for each type τi:
Deﬁnition: A strategy σi ∈ Hi is strictly dominated for agent i with respect to H = ×j∈NHj if
for each τi ∈ Ti there exists σ
0
i ∈ Hi such that for every σ−i ∈ ×j6=iHj,
Ui(g ◦ (σ
0
i,σ−i)|τi) > Ui(g ◦ (σi,σ−i)|τi).
9Let Ki(H) denote the set of all undominated strategies for agent i with respect
to H = ×i∈NHi. Let K(H) = ×i∈NKi(H). Let K0
i(Σ) = Σi and for each k ≥
1, Kk(Σ) = ×i∈NKk
i (Σ), where Σ = ×i∈NΣi and Kk







Deﬁnition 3 (Iterative Dominance) A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is iteratively un-
dominated if σ ∈ K∗.
An SCF f is said to be exactly implementable in iteratively undominated strate-
gies for a type space T if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M,g) such that for any
σ ∈ K∗, g(σ(τ)) = f(ˆ t(τ)) for all τ ∈ T . We add the requirement that this deﬁni-
tion should hold for every consistent type space T to obtain the deﬁnition of robust
implementation:
Deﬁnition 4 (Robust Implementation) An SCF f is said to be robustly im-
plementable in iteratively undominated strategies if there exists a mechanism Γ =
(M,g) such that for any σ ∈ K∗, g(σ(τ)) = f(ˆ t(τ)) for every τ ∈ T and every
consistent type space T .




  t ∈ T, S ∈ A
	
The notation f(t|S) refers to the lottery f(t) ∈ ∆(A) when its support is restricted
to S ∈ A.
An SCF f is said to be virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strate-
gies for a consistent type space T if, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ¯ ε],
there exists an SCF fε for which d(f,fε) < ε and fε is exactly implementable in
iteratively undominated strategies for the type space T .
The deﬁnition of implementability that will be used in this paper follows:
Deﬁnition 5 (Robust Virtual Implementation) An SCF f is robustly virtu-
ally implementable in iteratively undominated strategies if there exists ¯ ε > 0 such
10that, for any ε ∈ (0, ¯ ε], there exists an SCF fε for which d(f,fε) < ε and fε is
robustly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies.
The next standard deﬁnition is very important in the entire economic theory of
information:
Deﬁnition 6 (Incentive Compatibility) An SCF f : T → ∆(A) is said to be











We shall say that an SCF f is strictly incentive compatible if all the inequalities
in the preceding deﬁnition are strict whenever ˆ ti(τi) 6= ˆ ti(τ
0
i).
Deﬁne Vi(f|ti) to be the interim expected utility of agent i of pseudo-type ti







where ti ≡ (θi,qi) ∈ Ti = Θi×Qi. We call Vi(f|ti) the pseudo-interim utility of agent
i.
This notion suggests the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 7 (Pseudo-Incentive Compatibility) An SCF f : T → ∆(A) is























We shall say that an SCF f is strictly pseudo-incentive compatible if all the
inequalities in the preceding deﬁnition are strict.
The next lemma provides a useful link between these concepts:
11Lemma 1 An SCF f : T → ∆(A) is incentive compatible for any consistent type
space T if and only if it is pseudo-incentive compatible.
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . For each τi ∈ Ti,
let ˆ ti(τi) ≡ ti and ˆ θi(τi) ≡ θi.














































(∵ t−i = (θ−i,q−i) ∈ Θ−i × Q−i)
⇔ pseudo-incentive compatibility.
As is well-known, the next proposition identiﬁes incentive compatibility as a
necessary condition for implementability:
Proposition 1 If an SCF is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively undom-
inated strategies, then it is incentive compatible for every consistent type space.
Proof of Proposition 1: By our hypothesis, there exists an SCF fε such that
d(fε,f) < ε and fε is robustly exactly implementable in iteratively undominated
strategies for any consistent type space T . Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T .
Suppose that f is not incentive compatible; that is, the weak inequality in deﬁnition
6 does not hold. Then, there exists a small enough ε > 0 such that the same
inequality for fε does not hold either. Therefore, fε is not incentive compatible and,
thus, cannot be exactly implementable, a contradiction.
Since the same argument holds for any consistent type space, one can conclude
that for ε > 0 small enough, f is incentive compatible for every consistent type space
if and only if fε is incentive compatible for every consistent type space. 
12We shall make the following weak regularity assumption on environments:
Deﬁnition 8 (Pseudo-NTI) An environment E satisﬁes pseudo-no-total-indif-











Pseudo-NTI simply rules out indiﬀerence (in terms of pseudo-interim expected
utility) across all lotteries.
Let A = {a1,...,aK} be the ﬁnite set of alternatives.8 Henceforth, we will ﬁnd
it convenient to identify a lottery x ∈ ∆(A) as a point in the (K − 1) dimensional




k=1 xk = 1}. Deﬁne V k
i (ti) to be the
interim expected utility of agent i of pseudo-type ti = (θi,qi) for the constant SCF







Let Vi(ti) = (V 1
i (ti),...,V K
i (ti)).
Next, we deﬁne the condition of pseudo-type diversity in an environment, which
will play an important role in our analysis:
Deﬁnition 9 (Pseudo-TD) An environment E satisﬁes pseudo-type diversity






i) ∈ Ti with
ti 6= t
0




where e is the unit vector in ∆K−1.
Pseudo-type diversity is a generalization of the type diversity condition for a
8This is done for simplicity. If A were an arbitrary separable space, we would work with its
countable dense subset. The reader is referred to Section 6 of Abreu and Sen (1991) or to Duggan
(1997) for more details.
13standard Bayesian environment, used in Serrano and Vohra (2005). The reader is
referred to that paper to ﬁnd an appraisal of the connections of type diversity with
the conditions of interim value distinguished types (Palfrey and Srivastava (1993,
deﬁnition 6.3)), incentive consistency (Duggan (1997)), and with the algorithm be-
hind measurability due to Abreu and Matsushima (1992). We will have more to say
about the latter connection in the next sections. 9
Remark: Pseudo-TD is generically satisﬁed in the space of pseudo-interim prefer-
ences over pure outcomes if |A| ≥ 3. As noted above, when we consider a consistent
type space T in which Ti = Θi and Qi is a singleton for each agent i ∈ N, pseudo-TD
is reduced to TD of Serrano and Vohra (2005).
For every consistent type space T , deﬁne Uk
i (τi) to be the interim expected utility







So, the condition of TD would ask that no two types of an agent can be found
for whom these vectors are positive aﬃne transformations of one another. The next
lemma explains how to go from pseudo-TD to TD:
Lemma 2 Suppose that an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-TD. Then, for any con-
sistent type space T , there do not exist i ∈ N, τi,τ
0
i ∈ Ti with ˆ ti(τi) 6= ˆ ti(τ
0
i), β > 0,




where e is the unit vector in ∆K−1.
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . As it will become
clear, the argument does not depend on any particular type space consistent with the
original environment E. Consider agent i of type τi. Let ˆ ti(τi) ≡ ti and ˆ θi(τi) ≡ θi.
9 If A is a separable metric space, let A∗ = {a1,a2,...} be a countable dense subset of A. Now,
we can deﬁne
Vi(ti) = (V k
i (ti))∞
k=1 ∈ R∞
We also deﬁne e as the countable unit base in A with kek = 1. With these qualiﬁcations, pseudo-TD
is also well deﬁned for separable metric spaces.
14We claim that Uk
i (τi) = V k



























qi(θ−i|θi)ui(ak;θi,θ−i) (∵ ˆ θi(ti) = θi)
= V
k
i (ti) (∵ ti ≡ (θi,qi)).
Thus, we obtain Uk
i (τi) = V k
i (ti) whenever ˆ ti(τi) = ti. Similarly, consider agent i
of type τ
0












i) = V k
i (t
0




i. Having established this, pseudo-TD takes care
of the rest of the argument. 
In environments satisfying pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD, we next show the follow-
ing critical lemma, a generalization of Lemma 1 in Serrano and Vohra (2005).
Lemma 3 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD. Then




i∈N such that for every i ∈ N and ti,t
0
i ∈ Ti






Remark: All is needed for this lemma is the assumption that the individual pref-
erences over lotteries are monotone in the sense that any shift of probability weight
from a less preferred to a more preferred pure alternative yields a lottery which is
preferred. The axiom that preferences are monotone is, of course, much weaker than
the independence axiom, and is implied by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
representation.
15Proof of Lemma 3: Consider the constant SCF ¯ x, which prescribes in each
state the lottery ¯ x, assigning equal probability to each alternative in A, i.e., ¯ x(t) =
(1/K,...,1/K) for all t ∈ T. We will use induction on the number of pseudo-types
of agent i.
First, we show that for i ∈ N, and for two pseudo-types ti,t
0
i ∈ Ti with ti 6= t
0
i,
there exist constant SCFs x and x










The interim indiﬀerence curve of agent i of pseudo-type ti through ¯ x is described








   
K−1 X
k=1
pk(ti)xk = ¯ u
)
,
where pk(ti) = (V k
i (ti) − V K
i (ti)) for k = 1,...,K − 1.
Let p(ti) = (p1(ti),...,pK−1(ti)) ∈ RK−1. Consider the interim indiﬀerence hy-
perplane through ¯ x of agent i of pseudo-type t
0




















Given pseudo-NTI, we must have p(ti) 6= 0 and p(t
0
i) 6= 0. We claim that p(ti) 6=
cp(t
0
i) for any c > 0. Suppose not; that is, there is c > 0 such that p(ti) = cp(t
0
i).
This implies that Vi(ti) = cVi(t
0
i) + γe, which contradicts pseudo-TD. Thus, either
p(ti) = cp(t
0
i) where c < 0 or there does not exist c 6= 0 such that p(ti) = cp(t
0
i). In
the former case, it is easy to see (using pseudo-NTI) that any point which lies above
H must be below H
0 and, choosing two points (one above H and one below it) close
to ¯ x, one ﬁnds constant SCFs which satisfy (1). In the latter case, it is clear that we
can choose two constant SCFs which satisfy (1).
Now, according to the induction hypothesis, suppose that for the ﬁrst |Ti| − 1
pseudo-types of agent i, i.e., for all ti ∈ Ti \ {t0
i}, we have been able to ﬁnd |Ti| − 1




i)|ti) for every t
0
i ∈ Ti \ {t0
i,ti}. Consider pseudo-type t0
i. Choose the constant
SCF among the collection (x(ti))ti∈Ti\{t0
i} that is ranked highest by pseudo-type t0
i
(without loss of generality, there is only one). Call it x(ti). By arguments similar
to the ones in the previous paragraph, because of pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD, one
can ﬁnd a constant SCF near x(ti), call it x(t0
i), such that pseudo-types ti and t0
i
satisfy (1). Finally, since all inequalities concerning the other pseudo-types and their
associated SCFs are strict, x(t0
i) can be chosen so that the collection of constant
SCFs (x(ti))ti∈Ti satisfy all the inequalities in the statement of the lemma, so the
proof is complete.10 
Corollary 1 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD. Then




i∈N such that for any consistent type space T
in which for every i ∈ N and τi,τ
0
i ∈ Ti with ˆ ti(τi) 6= ˆ ti(τ
0
i),
Ui(`i(ˆ ti(τi))|τi) > Ui(`i(ˆ ti(τ
0
i))|τi).
Proof of Corollary 1: This follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3. 
3 A Robust Canonical Mechanism
This section introduces a mechanism that will be used to obtain a very permissive
robust virtual implementation result over all consistent type spaces. Among its
virtues, one should stress its ﬁniteness, so that best replies are always well deﬁned.
The mechanism Γ = (M,g) uses the collection of constant SCFs `i of Lemma
3.11 The construction is as follows: Every player i makes (J + 1) simultaneous





i × ··· × M
J
i = Ti × Ti × ··· × Ti | {z }
J+1
.
10If A is a separable metric space, the modiﬁcation we must make to the previous argument is
the way we deﬁne the lottery ¯ x(t):
¯ x(t) = (¯ xk(t))∞
k=1
where ¯ xk(t) = (1 − δ)δk−1, and 0 < δ < 1.
11It is inspired by the heuristic section of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) that precedes their
formal analysis. We dispense with two important assumptions made there: private values and the



























We introduce the following bribe/punishment lottery to reward a coherent an-
nouncement from each agent:
ξ(i,m) =

      
      
argmin`i(ti)∈{`i(ti)}ti∈Ti{Vi(`i(ti)|m0




i for i ∈ N and
ms = m0 ∀ s ∈ {0,...,j − 1}.
`i(m0
i) otherwise
We call it bribe/punishment lottery because the agent gets his best `i, given m0
i,
unless the agent changes his announcement before any change in announcements is
































where ε is small and strictly positive.
This outcome function has three terms: the ﬁrst, weighted by a probability of
ε, depends only on m0 and consists of the SCFs from Section 2 that induce the
separation of types; the second, weighted by ε2, is the bribe/punishment lottery we
have just constructed; the third term, having the remaining weight, depends on the




















s) + (1 − ε
2)f(m
s).
Note that if f satisﬁes incentive compatibility, ˜ f satisﬁes strict incentive compat-
ibility. This is because of the addition of the `i terms. Besides, ˜ f is close to f for
small ε > 0.
4 The Main Result
Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . Let σ be an iteratively undominated























s : T → M
s.
Theorem 1 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD. If an
SCF f is incentive compatible for every consistent type space T , it is robustly virtually
implementable in iteratively undominated strategies.
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . It will be clear
that the argument does not depend on T , as long as it is consistent with the pseudo-
type space. The proof consists of two claims using the mechanism of the previous
section.
Claim 1.1: Suppose that σ is an iteratively undominated strategy proﬁle of the
mechanism Γ. Then, σ0
i(τi) = ˆ ti(τi) for all i ∈ N and τi ∈ Ti.



















19The above inequality is well deﬁned when N is ﬁnite and Ti is ﬁnite for every i ∈ N.



























Here, η0 and η1 are the minimal and maximal eﬀects on pseudo-interim expected
utility associated with the “bribe/punishment” lottery, respectively. Then, by our








> η1 ∀ ti ∈ Ti,t
0
i ∈ Ti\{ti}.
Note that ε,η0,η1 are chosen independently of the choice of any particular con-
sistent type space.
Recall the outcome function of the mechanism, and notice that announcement m0
i
aﬀects only the ﬁrst term and possibly the second through the “bribe/punishment”
lottery. According to the last inequality, the payoﬀ loss from misreporting one’s
pseudo-type in m0
i exceeds the maximum possible gain from the second term, what-
ever strategies are used by the other agents. Thus, player i will be strictly better oﬀ
by telling the truth in the 0th announcement, even if he were to misrepresent the
rest of his announcements.
Formally, we argue by contradiction. Let σ be a strategy proﬁle such that σ0
i(τi) =
ti 6= ˆ ti(τi) for some player i of some type τi.



















i(τi) = ˆ ti(τi).
20We compare below the interim utilities of agent i of type τi when he employs σi
and ˆ σi against any ˜ σ−i ∈ Σ−i:




Vi(`i(ˆ ti(τi))|ˆ ti(τi)) +
ε2
n







Vi(ξ(i,σi, ˜ σ−i)|ˆ ti(τi)) + λ
= Ui(g ◦ (σi, ˜ σ−i)|τi),
where λ is a shorthand that denotes the rest of terms, which are the same in both
expressions. Thus, ˆ σi strictly dominates σi. 
Claim 1.2: For every i ∈ N, let σi be an iteratively undominated strategy.
Suppose that σs




i (τi) = ˆ ti(τi) for all i ∈ N and all τi ∈ Ti.
Proof of Claim 1.2: We need some additional pieces of notation for the proof.
A deception is a proﬁle of functions, α = (αi)i∈N, where αi : Ti → Ti. Consider the




0 for some player i
0 6= i of type ti
0. Let ˜ f ◦ α(t) = ˜ f(α(t)) for all



















The number γ is well deﬁned because Ti is ﬁnite for every i ∈ N.12
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that σ
j+1
i (τi) 6= ˆ ti(τi) for some player i of some
type τi.
12There is an implicit assumption here that the maximum and minimum terms in γi(ti) are not
the same for every i and every ti, which will be true for almost all values of ε – see the deﬁnition
of ˜ f.



















i (τi) = ˆ ti(τi).




0) = ˆ ti
0(τi
0) for all i
0 6= i and all
τi
0 ∈ Ti
0, then, by strict incentive compatibility of ˜ f, ¯ σi yields higher payoﬀ than
σi in the j + 1-st term of the third part of the outcome function. In addition, the
“bribe/punishment” second term cannot get worse by using ¯ σi instead of σi. Thus,
in this case, ¯ σi has a higher expected payoﬀ than σi.




0) 6= ˆ ti
0(τi
0) for some player i
0 6= i of type
τi
0 ∈ Ti
0. Then, by construction of γ, for any σ−i under the inductive hypothesis, we
have
γ ≥ Ui( ˜ f ◦ σ













Ui( ˜ f ◦ σ







Then, by improving his payoﬀ in the “bribe/punishment” term, ¯ σi yields higher
payoﬀ than σi. That is, for any σ−i under the inductive hypothesis, we have
Ui(g ◦ (¯ σi,σ−i)|τi) > Ui(g ◦ σ|τi)
In other words, under the inductive hypothesis, it is always better for player i
of type τi to wait for one more round to misrepresent his type so that other players
misrepresent their type ﬁrst, thereby avoiding the punishment involved in the second
term of the outcome function. This, however, contradicts our hypothesis that σi is
an iteratively undominated strategy. 
Claims 1.1 and 1.2 together show that there is a unique iteratively undominated
strategy proﬁle σ with the property that σs
i(τi) = ˆ ti(τi) = ti for every i ∈ N, τi ∈ Ti,




1 − ε − ε
2
f(t) +





This outcome is arbitrarily close to f(t) for every t ∈ T when ε > 0 is chosen to be
small enough. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
5 A-M Measurability as a Necessary Condition
What we have shown so far is that generically robust virtual implementation in it-
eratively undominated strategies is as successful as it can possibly be. That is, in
environments satisfying pseudo-type diversity, an SCF that is incentive compatible on
every consistent type space is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively undom-
inated strategies. In an important paper, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) uncovered
a condition that they termed measurability (we shall refer to it from now on as A-M
measurability) that was necessary for virtual implementation in iteratively undom-
inated strategies over a standard environment that ﬁxes a Bayesian type space. In
this section we revisit the A-M measurability condition by applying it to our robust
implementation analysis. In the process, a connection with pseudo-type diversity
will also be explained.
Denote by Ψi a partition of the set of pseudo-types Ti, where ψi is a generic
element of Ψi and Πi(ti) is the element of Ψi that includes pseudo-type ti. Let
Ψ = ×i∈NΨi and ψ = ×i∈Nψi.
Deﬁnition 10 An SCF f is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every i ∈ N
and every ti,t
0





i,t−i) ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Measurability of f with respect to Ψ implies that for any player i, f does not
distinguish between any pair of pseudo-types in the same cell of the partition Ψi.
Deﬁnition 11 Let T be a consistent type space. A strategy σi for player i is mea-
23surable with respect to Ψi if for every τi,τ
0
i ∈ Ti,
Πi(ˆ ti(τi)) = Πi(ˆ ti(τ
0
i)) =⇒ σi(τi) = σi(τ
0
i).
A strategy proﬁle σ is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every i ∈ N, σi is
measurable with respect to Ψi.
For every i ∈ N, ti,t
0
i ∈ Ti, and (n − 1) tuple of partitions Ψ−i, we say that ti is
equivalent to t
0
i with respect to Ψ−i if, for every f and every ˜ f which are measurable
with respect to Ti × Ψ−i,
Vi(f|ti) ≥ Vi( ˜ f|ti) ⇐⇒ Vi(f|t
0
i) ≥ Vi( ˜ f|t
0
i).
Fix a consistent type space T . Then, we say that τi is equivalent to τ
0
i with
respect to Ψ−i if, for every f and ˜ f that are measurable with respect to Ti × Ψ−i,
Ui(f|τi) ≥ Ui( ˜ f|τi) ⇐⇒ Ui(f|τ
0
i) ≥ Ui( ˜ f|τ
0
i).
Lemma 4 Let T be any type space consistent with the original environment. Then,
type τi is equivalent to type τ
0
i with respect to Ψ−i whenever ˆ ti(τi) is equivalent to
ˆ ti(τ
0
i) with respect to Ψ−i.
Proof of Lemma 4: Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . Let ti ≡ ˆ ti(τi)
and t
0
i ≡ ˆ ti(τ
0
i). Consider an arbitrary type τi and an arbitrary SCF f : T → ∆(A).
By arguments identical to those used in the proof of Lemma 1, one can show that
Ui(f|τi) = Vi(f|ti).
Consider arbitrary SCFs f and ˜ f that are measurable with respect to Ti × Ψ−i.
Then, the hypothesis that ti is equivalent to t
0
i with respect to Ψ−i implies
Vi(f|ti) ≥ Vi( ˜ f|ti) ⇐⇒ Vi(f|t
0
i) ≥ Vi( ˜ f|t
0
i).





any SCF f, we can conclude
Ui(f|τi) ≥ Ui( ˜ f|τi) ⇐⇒ Ui(f|τ
0
i) ≥ Ui( ˜ f|τ
0
i).
24This implies that τi is equivalent to τ
0
i with respect to Ψ−i. 
Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . Suppose that player i believes that every
SCF is measurable with respect to Ti × Ψ−i. Assume further that τi is equivalent
to τ
0
i with respect to Ψ−i. Then, player i’s interim expected utility under type τi is
exactly the same as under type τ
0
i when evaluating any SCF.
Let ρi(ti,Ψ−i) be the set of all elements of Ti that are equivalent to ti with respect
to Ψ−i, and let
Ri(Ψ−i) = {ρi(ti,Ψ−i) ⊂ Ti| ti ∈ Ti}.
Note that Ri(Ψ−i) forms an equivalence class on Ti, that is, constitutes a partition
of Ti. We deﬁne an inﬁnite sequence of n-tuples of partitions, {Ψh}∞
h=0, where Ψh =
×i∈NΨh










Note that for every h ≥ 0, Ψ
h+1
i is the same as, or ﬁner than, Ψh








Since Ti is ﬁnite for each agent i ∈ N, Lemma 4 guarantees that there exists a
positive integer L such that Ψh = ΨL for any h ≥ L. We denote Ψ∗ = ΨL.
Deﬁnition 12 An SCF f is A-M measurable if it is measurable with respect to
Ψ∗.
Note how the partitions Ψ0, Ψ1, ..., and hence, the ﬁnal partition Ψ∗ used in A-M
measurability are really nothing but a property of the environment. The aim is to
“treat equally” those pseudo-types that are “indistinguishable” according to their
interim preferences. Thus, we start considering constant SCFs, i.e., SCFs that are
25measurable with respect to the coarsest possible partition, and we separate pseudo-
types who have diﬀerent interim preferences over this class of SCFs. This gives us
a new partition of the set of pseudo-types for each agent (iteration 1). Next, we
consider SCFs measurable with respect to these new partitions, and ask the same
question: are there pseudo-types that, having the same preferences over constant
SCFs, now can be separated because they exhibit diﬀerent interim preferences over
the enlarged class of SCFs considered? If the answer is No, the process ends and we
have found Ψ∗. If it is Yes, we proceed to make the induced ﬁner partition of each
set of pseudo-types (iteration 2), and so on. The process ends after a ﬁnite number
of steps with the identiﬁcation of Ψ∗, which provides the maximum possible degree
of pseudo-type separation or distinguishability in terms of interim preferences. A-M
measurability simply asks that the SCF not distinguish between diﬀerent pseudo-
types that are “indistinguishable” according to Ψ∗.
When a consistent type space T satisﬁes the properties that Ti = Θi and Qi
is a singleton for each i ∈ N, A-M measurability is reduced to the measurability
proposed by Abreu and Matsushima (1992).
Deﬁne
F = {h | h(t) is a degenerate lottery for all t ∈ T}.
Recall that Ti is ﬁnite for every i ∈ N. Assume also that A is ﬁnite.13 Then, F
becomes a ﬁnite functional space. Deﬁne also
F(Ψ) = {h ∈ F| h is measurable with respect to Ψ}.
Let |F(Ti × Ψ−i)| = K.14 Deﬁne V k
i (ti,Ψ−i) to be the interim expected utility of










Let Vi(ti,Ψ−i) = (V 1
i (ti,Ψ−i),...,V K
i (ti,Ψ−i)).
13If A were a separable space, we would work with its countable dense subset.
14This is a slight abuse of notation, since K was deﬁned in previous sections as the ﬁnite number
of alternatives in the set A. In part, we choose to use the same symbol here to enhance the parallels
across the arguments in the diﬀerent sections. Also, it should not cause any confusion.
26The next lemma follows simply from the deﬁnitions of F(Ψ) and of equivalent
types. Its proof is omitted:
Lemma 5 Assume that A is ﬁnite. Then, ti is equivalent to t
0
i with respect to Ψ−i




where e is the unit vector in ∆K−1.
The following is a characterization of pseudo-TD in terms of the measurability
construction:
Corollary 2 An environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD if and only if
there do not exist i ∈ N and τi,τ
0




i such that ti is
equivalent to t
0
i with respect to Ψ0
−i for every consistent type space T . It follows that
Ψ1
i = Ti for each agent i ∈ N, and Ψ∗ = T in every consistent type space T .
In light of Corollary 2, one can make the following useful observation (see Serrano
and Vohra (2005) for a similar assertion concerning TD):
Lemma 6 (TD and NTI ⇒ A-M measurability) Suppose an environment sat-
isﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD. Then, every SCF is A-M measurable.
That is, if the environment satisﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD, the algorithm
that separates types in the deﬁnition of measurability arrives at the ﬁnest partition
at the ﬁrst round. As already said, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) show that A-
M measurability is a necessary condition for virtual implementation in iteratively
undominated strategies. We adapt their proof to our setup:
Proposition 2 If an SCF f is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively un-
dominated strategies, then it is A-M measurable.
Proof of Proposition 2: Since f is robustly virtually implementable in it-
eratively undominated strategies, there exists fε that is exactly implementable in
iteratively undominated strategies and d(f,fε) < ε for ε > 0 small for any consistent
type space T . Consider a mechanism Γ = (M,g) which exactly implements the SCF
27fε in iteratively undominated strategies for any consistent type space T . Fix an
arbitrary consistent type space T and for each h ≥ 1, let Kh = ×i∈NKh
i be the sets
of iteratively undominated strategies at the h-th round of iterative removal for the
type space T .
Consider an arbitrary “constant” strategy proﬁle σ[0] ∈ K0 which is measurable
with respect to ×i∈N{Ti}. Then, either g(σ[0]) = fε, which is then constant, i.e.,
measurable with respect to ×i∈N{Ti}, and hence we are done because it is A-M
measurable a fortiori (i.e., measurable with respect to Ψ∗), or g(σ[0]) 6= fε.
In this case, by the deﬁnition of Ψ1 and our hypothesis that fε is exactly im-
plementable in iteratively undominated strategies for the type space T , it follows
that for every i ∈ N, there exists σi[1] ∈ Σi that is a best response to σ−i[0] and
is measurable with respect to Ψ1
i. Hence, σi[1] is not strictly dominated for player
i with respect to K0, that is, σi[1] ∈ K1
i. Again, either g(σ[1]) = fε, but then fε
is measurable with respect to Ψ1, and hence A-M measurable; or g(σ[1]) 6= fε, in
which case at least one type ﬁnds his strategy σi[1] as strictly dominated given K1,
and so on.
Take an arbitrary h = 2,3,..., and suppose that there exists a strategy proﬁle
σ[h−1] ∈ Kh−1 that is measurable with respect to Ψh−1. Again, either g(σ[h−1]) =
fε and we are done, or not. If not, since fε is exactly implementable in iteratively
undominated strategies for the type space T by our hypothesis, for every i ∈ N,
there exists σi[h] ∈ Σi that is a best response to σ−i[h − 1] and is measurable with
respect to Ψh
i . Therefore, σi[h] is not strictly dominated for player i with respect
to Kh−1. Hence, for all h = 0,1,..., there exists σ[h] ∈ Kh that is measurable with
respect to Ψh.
Let σ∗ be an iteratively undominated strategy proﬁle in the implementing game
form Γ. Then, the preceding argument implies that σ∗ is measurable with respect to
Ψ∗. It follows that fε = g◦σ∗ is measurable with respect to Ψ∗ and therefore, is A-M
measurable. Finally, for suﬃciently small ε > 0, it follows that f is A-M measurable
if and only if fε is A-M measurable. Note how the same conclusion obtains regardless
of any particular consistent type space T . 
286 A Characterization of Robust Virtual Imple-
mentation
For a ﬁxed type space, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) show that, under an addi-
tional assumption essentially similar to quasilinear utilities (Assumption 2 in their
paper) and using small ﬁnes to punish oﬀ-equilibrium behavior, A-M measurability
and incentive compatibility are suﬃcient for virtual implementation in iteratively
undominated strategies. In our environments, we also establish that (appropriately
reformulated) incentive compatibility and A-M measurability are suﬃcient as well
as necessary for robust virtual implementation. We note that we are not making
assumptions equivalent to Abreu and Matsushima’s Assumption 2.
Given our results so far – Theorem 1 – we know that A-M measurability is
“almost always” a trivial condition, since it can be completely dispensed with in
environments satisfying pseudo-TD. For the rest of environments, A-M measurability
imposes additional restrictions, and sometimes those restrictions are so severe that
only constant SCFs can be virtually implemented (see Serrano and Vohra (2001),
Bergemann and Morris (2007)). We turn to formalities now.
Recall the recursive construction behind A-M measurability, and, in particular,
the partitions Ψh
i for i ∈ N and h = 0,1,.... For each i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, and h ≥ 0, let
Πh
i (ti) be the element of Ψh
i that includes ti.
As we will be using a mechanism similar to the one in section 3, our initial task
is to construct the ﬁrst – separating – term of the outcome function. The next
lemma provides SCFs that will help us separate pseudo-types, as allowed by the h-th
iteration in the measurability construction. It is a generalization of Lemma 3.
Lemma 7 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI. Then, for every i ∈ N
and every h = 1,2,...,L, there exist SCFs xh
i [ψh
i ] : T → ∆(A), which are measurable
with respect to Ψh
i × Ψ
h−1

































i [·](·,θ−i,q−i); ˆ θi(ti),θ−i)).
Proof of Lemma 7: Again we write the proof for the case when A is ﬁnite.15
Fix iteration h in the A-M measurability algorithm. Consider the SCF ¯ xh, which


















for all t ∈ T. Here, |F(Ψh
i × Ψ
h−1




−i , and, abusing notation, we can write ¯ xh(t) = ¯ xh(Πh(t)).16
We claim that for every i ∈ N, every ti,t
0
i ∈ Ti, with Πh








































We can prove this claim by using the same argument as in Lemma 3. That is, consider




−i ). Note how the pseudo-interim expected utility of each
extreme point is well deﬁned for each pseudo-type, and thus, one can consider the
corresponding hyperplanes as the level curves of such interim utility. By construction
of the h-th iteration of measurability, pseudo-types ti and t
0
i can be separated in their
interim preferences over SCFs in F(Ψh
i × Ψ
h−1
−i ) whenever Πh




using the argument in the proof of Lemma 3, one can ﬁnd two SCFs to separate
the two pseudo-types as written in (2). The rest of the argument is based on an
induction step on the number of elements of Ψh
i , exactly as in the proof of Lemma
3. 
15If A were a separable metric space, we would work with its countable dense subset as in
footnote 9.
16In fact, given the mechanism we construct below, in which agents report atoms of the partition
ψ∗
i and not pseudo-types, this will be a convenient way to write the argument of an SCF. Therefore,
we shall use this repeatedly in the rest of this section.
30The next lemma extends the previous one from pseudo-types to types in a con-
sistent type space:
Lemma 8 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI. Then, for every i ∈ N
and every h = 1,2,...,L, there exist SCFs xh
i [ψh
i ] : T → ∆(A) that are measurable
with respect to Ψh
i × Ψ
h−1
−i such that for every consistent type space T , for every

































i [·](·,ˆ t−i(τ−i)); ˆ θ(τi,τ−i)).
Proof of Lemma 8: This follows directly from Lemmas 4 and 7. 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 2 (A Characterization of Robust Virtual Implementation) Suppose
an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI. An SCF f is robustly virtually imple-
mentable in iteratively undominated strategies if and only if it is incentive compat-
ible for every consistent type space and A-M measurable.
Proof of Theorem 2: By Propositions 1 and 2, incentive compatibility for
every consistent type space and A-M measurability are necessary conditions. We
shall now establish that they are also suﬃcient, by constructing a canonical imple-
menting mechanism. We note that the construction of the canonical mechanism of
this section is a generalization of that in Theorem 1 once we take into account that
the measurability algorithm may not stop at the ﬁrst step.
In the mechanism ˜ Γ, every player i makes (J + 1) simultaneous announcements;











i × ··· × Ψ
∗
i | {z }
J+1
for an integer J to be deﬁned below. Correspondingly, the truthful s-th announce-
31ment for type τi with pseudo-type ti is ms
i = Π∗
i(ti).













i (ti)](t) ∀t ∈ T
where xh
i [Πh
i (ti)] are arbitrary constant SCFs for h = 0, and are as constructed in
Lemma 8 for each h > 0; 0 < δ < 1. Also, α is deﬁned as
α ≡
1
1 + δ + δ2 + ··· + δL.
Note how x is A-M measurable by construction. Recall that, thanks to A-M mea-
surability, we can abuse notation and write, for any ψ ∈ Ψ∗, x(ψ) = x(t) whenever
ψ = Π∗(t).
Deﬁne the “bribe/punishment” lottery ξ : N × M → ∆(A) as follows:
ξ(i,m) =

      









i for i ∈ N and
ms = m0 ∀ s ∈ {1,...,j − 1}.
x(m0) otherwise






for any t ∈ T. Note that xL
i [·] is A-M measurable.
Let the outcome function of the mechanism ˜ Γ be ˜ g, deﬁned as follows:
























−i) + (1 − ε
2)f(m
s).
32The next few paragraphs introduce several parameters, and ﬁx their permissible
values for the rest of the proof.













i ]|ti) > 2η.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, η > 0 is well deﬁned when the sets of pseudo-types
are ﬁnite.






); ˆ θ(t)) − ui(y(ti,t
0
−i); ˆ θ(t))|.
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i ]|ti) + η
	
> 0.
It is important to note that ε,η,δ,η0(L), and η1(L) are chosen independently of
the type space T . Fix all of these variables at the speciﬁed levels.
The rest of the argument in the proof relies on two steps, as Claims 1.1 and 1.2
in Theorem 1, although it is somewhat more complicated. Speciﬁcally, the proof
will require double use of mathematical induction. Claims 2.1 and 2.2 below, similar
33to Claims 1.1 and 1.2 of Theorem 1, construct an induction step on the number of
announcements j in the canonical mechanism for each agent. This serves to establish
that if each agent i is using an iteratively undominated strategy, he must be reporting
Π∗
i(ti) (J + 1) times when his pseudo-type is ti. However, to establish Claim 2.1,
a second induction argument is required, this time on h, the rounds of iteration in
the A-M measurability algorithm. This is needed because the functions xh
i [·] that
are used to separate pseudo-types are not independent of the announcements made
by others (unlike the `i’s functions of Theorem 1). Now we proceed to complete the
argument.
Fix an arbitrary consistent type space T . All the analysis is invariant to the
particular choice of type space made.
Claim 2.1: Let σ be an iteratively undominated strategy proﬁle of the mechanism
˜ Γ. Then, for any i ∈ N, τi ∈ Ti, and h = 0,1,...,L, we have σ0
i(τi) ⊂ Πh
i (ˆ ti(τi)). In
other words, σ0
i(τi) = Π∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)) for any τi ∈ Ti and i ∈ N.
Proof of Claim 2.1: We prove this step by induction with respect to h. Suppose
h = 0. Then, Π0
i(ˆ ti(τi)) = Ti for any τi ∈ Ti and any i ∈ N. Therefore, the statement
σ0
i(τi) ⊂ Π0
i(ˆ ti(τi)) in Claim 2.1 is trivially satisﬁed.
Suppose that σ0
i(τi) ⊂ Πh
i (ˆ ti(τi)) for any τi ∈ Ti and any h ≤ L − 1. What we
want to show is that σ0
i(τi) ⊂ ΠL
i (ˆ ti(τi)), which equals Π∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)), for any τi ∈ Ti and









i = ˜ σ
j











i 6= τi and
˜ σ
0
i(ˆ ti(τi)) = Π
∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)).
With Lemma 4 concerning the equivalence of types in mind, for any σ−i under
the inductive hypothesis, we have that the expected utility gain from the ﬁrst term
34of the outcome function is:
ε




























This is because no xh
i , h < L, is aﬀected by this strategy change and because for
each i
0 6= i, xL
i

















































































Thus, what agent i of type τi loses from the ﬁrst term of the outcome function by mis-
reporting in the 0-th announcement cannot be compensated by the “bribe/punishment”
lottery, regardless of the other agents’ announcements.
Hence, for any τi,τ
0




i, ti 6= t
0
i, we obtain
Ui(g ◦ (˜ σi,σ−i)|τi) > Ui(g ◦ σ|τi).
The above inequality implies that player i will be strictly better oﬀ by telling the truth
in the 0-th announcement, even if he misrepresents the rest of his announcements.
Therefore, σi is strictly dominated by ˜ σi, which contradicts the hypothesis that σ is
an iteratively undominated strategy proﬁle. This completes the proof of Claim 2.1.

Claim 2.2: For every i ∈ N, let σi be an iteratively undominated strategy in the
mechanism ˜ Γ. Suppose that σs
i(τi) = Π∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)) for all i ∈ N, τi ∈ Ti and
35s ∈ {0,...,j}, where 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1. Then
σ
j+1
i (τi) = Π
∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)) for all i ∈ N and all τi ∈ Ti.
Proof of Claim 2.2: By Claim 2.1, we have proved that each agent tells the
truth at the 0-th announcement. Thus, ˜ f is strictly incentive compatible if f is
incentive compatible.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that σ
j+1
i (ˆ ti(τi)) 6= Π∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)) for some player i
of some type τi ∈ Ti. So, by the very construction of the “bribe/punishment” lottery,



















i (τi) = Π
∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)).
Under the inductive hypothesis, if σ
j+1
−i (ˆ t−i(τ−i)) = Π∗
−i(ˆ t−i(τ−i)) for all τ−i ∈ T−i,
then by strict incentive compatibility of ˜ f and by the deﬁnition of the “bribe/punishment”
lottery ξ(i,m), ¯ σi yields higher payoﬀ than σi.










0)) for some agent
i
0 6= i of some type τi
0 ∈ Ti
0. Then, we choose J large enough so that
η0(L) >
1 − ε − ε2
J
γ ≥
1 − ε − ε2
J
n
Ui( ˜ f ◦ σ







Then, ¯ σi yields higher payoﬀ than σi, which contradicts the hypothesis that σi is an
iteratively undominated strategy of agent i. This completes the proof of Claim 2.2.

Claims 2.1 and 2.2 together show that there is a unique iteratively undominated
strategy proﬁle σ with the property that σs
i(ˆ ti(τi)) = Π∗
i(ˆ ti(τi)) for any i ∈ N, τi ∈ Ti,
any consistent type space T , and s ∈ {0,1,...,J}. The resulting outcome is
(1 − ε









36Since the SCF f and x are A-M measurable, the resulting outcome is the same as
(1 − ε
2)(1 − ε − ε
2)f(t) + ε





This is arbitrarily close to f(t) for any t ∈ T whenever ε > 0 is chosen small enough.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
7 The Relationship with Virtual Bayesian Imple-
mentation
All our results have been obtained using the very weak solution concept of iteratively
undominated strategies. When robustness with respect to type spaces is a concern,
it follows that there must be a connection with the approach that uses Bayesian
equilibrium in every type space. This section explores this connection. First, consider
the following deﬁnitions:
Let B(Γ) be the set of mixed-strategy Bayesian equilibria of the mechanism Γ.
Deﬁnition 13 (Robust Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium) An SCF f
is said to be robustly implementable in mixed-strategy Bayesian equilibrium if
there exists a mechanism Γ = (M,g) such that B(Γ) 6= ∅ and for any σ∗ ∈ B(Γ),
g(σ∗(τ)) = f(ˆ t(τ)) for every τ ∈ T and every consistent type space T .
Deﬁnition 14 (Robust Virtual Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium)
An SCF f is robustly virtually implementable in mixed-strategy Bayesian equi-
librium if, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ¯ ε], there exists an SCF fε
for which d(f,fε) < ε and fε is robustly implementable in mixed-strategy Bayesian
equilibrium.
Let us begin with our Theorem 1, which shows that the set of iteratively un-
dominated strategies is not only unique but also strict. Thus, as an important by
product, we obtain the following result for environments satisfying pseudo-TD.
Corollary 3 (Robust Virtual Bayesian Implementation) Suppose an environ-
ment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI and pseudo-TD. If an SCF is incentive compatible for
37every consistent type space T , then it is robustly virtually implementable in mixed
strategy Bayesian equilibrium.
Next, with the same argument, one can provide the following simple corollary to
Theorem 2 if one does not assume pseudo-TD:
Corollary 4 (A Suﬃcient Condition for Robust Virtual Bayesian Imple-
mentation) Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI. An SCF f is robustly
virtually implementable in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium if it is incentive com-
patible for any consistent type space and A-M measurable.
It is important to note that A-M measurability is not necessary for robust virtual
implementation in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. To make this point, an
elaboration of the example in Section 5 of Serrano and Vohra (2005) would suﬃce.17
However, when the implementing mechanism is required to be regular, to be deﬁned
next, A-M measurability becomes necessary for robust virtual implementation in
mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium.
The next deﬁnitions are borrowed from Abreu and Matsushima (1992):
For every i ∈ N and every partition Ψi, let Σi(Ψi) denote the set of mixed
strategies of player i that are measurable with respect to Ψi.
Deﬁnition 15 (pseudo-Bayesian Equilibrium) The proﬁle σ ∈ Σ1(Ψ1) × ··· ×
Σn(Ψn) is a pseudo-Bayesian equilibrium with respect to Ψ in Γ for a consistent
type space T if for all i ∈ N and all ψi ∈ Ψi, there exists some τi ∈ Ti with ˆ ti(τi) ∈ ψi
such that





Deﬁnition 16 (Regular Mechanisms) A mechanism Γ is said to be regular if
for each Ψ there exists a pseudo-Bayesian equilibrium with respect to Ψ in Γ for any
consistent type space.
In particular, ﬁnite mechanisms – like the ones constructed in the proofs of The-
orems 1 and 2 – are regular. Mechanisms that rely on the use of integer games –
e.g., like the one constructed in Serrano and Vohra (2005) – are not regular.
17Although Serrano and Vohra (2005) restricts attention to implementation in pure strategies,
the argument can be extended to also cover mixed strategies.
38The next result extends a result in Abreu and Matsushima (1992) to our settings:
Proposition 3 If an SCF is robustly virtually implementable in mixed strategy Bayesian
equilibrium by a regular mechanism, then it is A-M measurable.
Proof of Proposition 3: Since f is robustly virtually implementable in Bayesian
equilibrium, there exists fε that is exactly implementable in Bayesian equilibrium
and d(f,fε) < ε for ε > 0 suﬃciently small for any consistent type space. Consider
a “regular” mechanism Γ = (M,g) that exactly implements the SCF fε in mixed
Bayesian equilibrium for any consistent type space. Fix an arbitrary consistent type
space T . Let σ ∈ ×i∈NΣi(Ψ∗
i) be a pseudo-Bayesian equilibrium with respect to Ψ∗.
Note that σ is measurable with respect to Ψ∗. What we want to show here is that σ
is a Bayesian equilibrium as well.
If mi = σi(τi) is a best response for player i of type τi, then mi is also a best
response for player i of any type τ
0
i such that ˆ ti(τ
0
i) ∈ ρi(ti,Ψ∗
−i). That is, this
implies that for any ψi ∈ Ψ∗
i, for any τi,τ
0
i ∈ Ti with ˆ ti(τi),ˆ ti(τ
0
i) ∈ ψi, the best
responses of player i of type τi and τ
0
i to any σ−i that is measurable with respect to
Ψ∗
−i are the same. Then, it follows that any pseudo-Bayesian equilibrium σ that is
measurable with respect to Ψ∗ is in fact a Bayesian equilibrium. Since fε = g ◦ σ
by our hypothesis that fε is exactly implementable in Bayesian equilibrium, fε is
measurable with respect to Ψ∗ and therefore it must be A-M measurable. Finally,
for a suﬃciently small ε > 0, it follows that f is A-M measurable if and only if fε is
A-M measurable. 
Putting together this proposition and Theorem 2, we arrive at the following:
Corollary 5 (A Characterization of Robust Virtual Bayesian Implemen-
tation) Suppose an environment E satisﬁes pseudo-NTI. An SCF f is robustly vir-
tually implementable in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium by a regular mechanism
if and only if it is incentive compatible for any consistent type space and A-M mea-
surable.
On the other hand, the usual approach for a ﬁxed type space to (exact and virtual)
Bayesian implementation has ruled out the consideration of mixed strategies.18 We
show next that if one includes robustness considerations with respect to type spaces,
18Duggan (1997) is a notable exception.
39the distinction between pure and mixed strategy equilibrium implementation is of
no signiﬁcance:
Proposition 4 An SCF is robustly virtually implementable in pure-strategy Bayesian
equilibrium if and only if it is robustly virtually implementable in mixed-strategy
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: That full implementation in mixed strategy equi-
librium implies full implementation in pure equilibrium is obvious. We argue the
opposite direction.
Suppose not. There exists an SCF f that is robustly virtually implementable
in pure Bayesian equilibrium that is not robustly virtually implementable in mixed
equilibrium. This means that any mechanism that virtually implements f in pure
equilibrium over every consistent type space has an equilibrium in properly mixed
strategies whose outcome does not approximate f. But then, one can construct a
suﬃciently large consistent type space and perform a puriﬁcation of that equilibrium.
The result is a pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism whose outcome
is far from f. This contradicts that f is robustly virtually implementable in pure-
strategy equilibrium. 
Thus, while implementation in pure or mixed equilibrium may give diﬀerent an-
swers for a ﬁxed type space, that diﬀerence goes away when one requires robustness
in implementation with respect to type spaces.
8 Conclusion
By proposing a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine – mechanisms be allowed
to depend on ﬁrst-order beliefs, besides payoﬀ types – we have shown that robust
virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies is “almost always” as
powerful as it can possibly be. Indeed, the limits of implementation are given by
incentive compatibility, but every incentive compatible SCF can be robustly virtually
implemented. Thus, even if one insists on robustness of implementation results with
respect to type spaces, there is a signiﬁcant gap between the very restrictive results
oﬀered by exact implementation and the much more permissive ones oﬀered by the
virtual approach.
40References
Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992): Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undom-
inated Strategies: Incomplete Information, Unpublished Manuscript, Princeton
University.
Abreu, D. and A. Sen (1991): Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium, Econo-
metrica, 59, 997-1021.
Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2003): Rationalisation and Incomplete Information,
Advances in Theoretical Economics, 3.
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005a): Robust Mechanism Design, Econometrica,
73, 1771-1813.
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005b): Robust Implementation: The Role of Large
Type Spaces, Unpublished Manuscript, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2007): Strategic Distinguishability with an Applica-
tion to Robust Virtual Implementation, Unpublished Manuscript, Yale University
and Princeton University.
Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1987): Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,
Econometrica, 55, 1391-1402.
Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1993): Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowl-
edge, Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 189-198.
Chakravorti, B. (1992): Eﬃciency and Mechanisms with no Regret, International
Economic Review, 33, 45-59.
Duggan, J. (1997): Virtual Bayesian Implementation, Econometrica, 65, 1175-1199.
Jackson, M. O. (1991): Bayesian Implementation, Econometrica, 59, 461-477.
Jackson, M. O. (2001): A Crash Course in Implementation Theory, Social Choice
and Welfare, 18, 655-708.
Jehiel, P., M. Meyer-ter-Vehn, B. Moldovanu and B. Zame (2006): The Limits of Ex
Post Implementation, Econometrica, 74, 585-610.
Maskin, E. S. and T. Sjostrom (2002): Implementation Theory, in Handbook of
Social Choice and Welfare (vol. I), ed. by K. J. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura,
New York, Elsevier Science B.V.
Mertens, J-F and S. Zamir (1985): Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with
Incomplete Information, International Journal of Game Theory, 14, 1-29.
41Myerson, R. B. (1989): Mechanism Design, in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Infor-
mation, and Markets, ed. by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, Norton,
New York.
Palfrey, T. R. (2002): Implementation Theory, in Handbook of Game Theory with
Economic Applications (vol. III), ed. by R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, New York,
Elsevier Science.
Palfrey, T. R. and S. Srivastava (1987): On Bayesian Implementable Allocations,
Review of Economic Studies, 54, 193-208.
Palfrey, T. R. and S. Srivastava (1989): Implementation with Incomplete Information
in Exchange Economies, Econometrica, 57, 115-134.
Palfrey, T. R. and S. Srivastava (1993): Bayesian Implementation, Harwood Acad-
emic Publishers, New York.
Postlewaite, A. and D. Schmeidler (1986): Implementation in Diﬀerential Informa-
tion Economies, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 14-33.
Serrano, R. (2004): The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules, SIAM
Review, 46, 377-414.
Serrano, R. and R. Vohra (2001): Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implemen-
tation, Econometrica, 69, 785-792.
Serrano, R. and R. Vohra (2005): A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implemen-
tation, Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 312-331.
Wilson, R. (1987): Game Theoretic Analysis of Trading Processes, in Advances in
Economic Theory, ed. by T. Bewley, Cambridge University Press.
42